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On October 2, 1968 the Mexican government massacred hundreds of peaceful 
protesters in Mexico City’s Tlatelolco plaza.  Up to this point, Mexico had not 
experienced large-scale violence since the Mexican Revolution of the 1910s.  The 
government’s authoritarian suppression of the movement surprised people throughout the 
country.  The PRI, the ruling party for decades had stayed in power since the triumph of 
the Revolution, and viewed demands for reform as a threat to their power.  With the 
opening ceremonies for the 1968 summer Olympic Games slated to begin October 12, the 
government did not want dissent visible to the international powers, and acted quickly to 
decapitate the movement.  Since protest movements had become commonplace globally 
throughout 1968, both the demonstrators in Mexico and the government learned from the 
examples set by other movements like those in France and Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
Ultimately, the government chose the Soviet path and attacked its own citizenry.  For 
years after the massacre at Tlatelolco, the event provided a reminder that the PRI 
government did not truly represent the interests of the populace.  As the generation of 
protestors from 1968 has grown up, they continue to influence the course of politics in 
Mexico to this day. 
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Introduction 
 
 On the night of October 2, 1968, government troops in Mexico City’s Tlatelolco 
Plaza massacred hundreds of unarmed student protesters.  While it is impossible to know 
the precise numbers of demonstrators due to the massive government cover-up of the 
attack, it is clear that thousands of students participated in the protest on the evening of 
October 2.  According to eyewitnesses of the chaos, at 6:10 p.m. helicopters surrounding 
the plaza moved down to the buildings and flares lit up the sky, causing protesters in the 
plaza to worry that something was awry.1  For each of the 5,000-15,000 activists in the 
area, nearly an equal number of soldiers came to put down the movement.2  Shortly after 
the flares startled the people assembled in the plaza, the soldiers began shooting at the 
crowd.  For many hours the troops continued to fire indiscriminately on the men, women, 
and children.3  Due to the huge military presence, the protesters could not flee the scene 
and “hundreds were literally slaughtered where they stood.”4    This thesis aims to 
reconstruct the context in which the Mexican government consciously chose to massacre 
hundreds of protestors.  Additionally, the thesis will offer an interpretation about the 
legacy of the 1968 massacre on the subsequent political development of Mexico. 
  In order to preserve the illusion that the Mexican government was a peaceful, 
democratic institution, president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz immediately covered up the 
immensity of the event by claiming that the number of deaths was “more than 30 and less 
                                                 
1 Preston, Julia and Samuel Dillon, Opening Mexico: The Making of Democracy (New York: Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux, 2004), 71.    
2 Matthew C. Gutmann, The Romance of Democracy: Compliant Defiance in Contemporary Mexico 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2002), 63. 
3 Donald J. Mabry, The Mexican University and the State: Student Conflicts 1910-1971 (College Station, 
TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1982), 265.  
4 Gutmann, 64. 
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than 40.”5  The news outlets, fed information by the government and watched closely by 
Díaz Ordaz, uniformly portrayed the students as armed attackers who had snipers in the 
buildings.  Thus the government portrayed the whole affair as an unfortunate accident in 
which the military was simply drawn in due to the violent student actions.  Due to this 
massive cover-up effort by the government, it is still difficult to ascertain the precise 
numbers of people killed, wounded, or even present at the plaza that night.  However, 
British newspaper correspondent John Rodda estimates based on careful investigation 
that there were at least 267 people killed and 1,200 wounded at Tlatelolco.6  Currently, 
most scholars estimate that around 300 people were killed in the violence of October 2, 
and many more wounded, reflecting a ten-fold increase of the false government figure of 
those killed. 
The government’s claim that the students instigated the violence also has been 
proven untrue.  The film Rojo Amanecer, released in 1992 and based on the events of 
1968, portrays the life of a family living in the apartment complex surrounding Tlatelolco 
and their increasing awareness of impending problems.   On October 2, all electricity and 
telephone communication had been cut off prior to the announced start of the student 
protest, illustrating careful outside planning.  Furthermore the eyewitness accounts that 
documented the presence of more than 10,000 soldiers and police throughout the 
complex and the use of helicopters and flares as a signaling device reinforce the argument 
that the government had planned to intervene.  In first-hand testimony from Ernesto 
Morales Soto, a soldier present at the Tlatelolco massacre, he recalled that many soldiers 
 
5 Gutmann, 64. 
6 Gutmann, 64. 
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were dressed as civilians, but wore identifying white gloves in order to not get caught up 
in the crossfire.  The army put Morales’s section in particular in charge of making sure 
that no one could enter or leave the plaza once the flare signaled the beginning of the 
attack.7  After the actual attack, the government even went so far as to coerce leaders of 
the student movement into “confessing” that the protest movement intended to implement 
a communist regime for the government.8  While some foreign newspapers shed light on 
the actual events of the massacre, the media in Mexico only reported the government’s 
official version of events, despite their fallaciousness.9      
Despite the government propaganda, the members of the military and police 
forces did not simply act in retaliation to student violence, but displayed a degree of 
brutality attributed to a pre-planned event.  Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci attended the 
demonstration, and was wounded during the events of the night.  She notes that despite 
laying “in a pool of my own blood for forty-five minutes,” the troops placed in the plaza 
by the state only took notice of her to remove a watch from her wrist and left her on the 
ground without assistance.10 Another first hand account of the horror faced by those at 
Tlatelolco confirms the viciousness of the night. “There was lots and lots of blood, so 
much of it that my hands felt sticky.  There was also blood all over the walls; it seems to 
me that the walls of Tlatelolco are drenched with blood.  It reeks of blood all over 
Tlatelolco.  Lots of people must have bled to death up there, because there was too much 
 
7 Elena Poniatowska, “A Massacre in Mexico” In Women Writing Resistance, edited by J. Browdy de 
Hernandez, (Cambridge, Mass:  South End Press, 2003), 140-1. 
8 Mabry, 266. 
9 Vania Markarian, “Debating Tlatelolco: Thirty Years of Public Debates about the Mexican Student 
Movement of 1968” In Taking Back the Academy!: History of Activism, History as Activism, edited  J. 
Downs and J. Manion (New York: Routledge, 2004), 27. 
10 Preston and Dillon, 77. 
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blood for it to have been that of just one person.”11  The gravity of the evening did not 
stop at the horrific accounts of those dead or wounded.  In addition to the casualty 
figures, the government detained nearly 2,500 people on fabricated charges.12  Thus, in 
one night the seemingly safe and democratic nation had perpetuated an atrocity 
associated with brutal authoritarian nations.    
To understand why the Díaz Ordaz administration chose to repress the movement 
on October 2, the political context leading up to the day must be understood.  In post-
revolutionary Mexico the situation of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) 
appeared fairly secure.  With impressive economic growth figures and the continual 
election of PRI candidates since the triumph of the Mexican Revolution, the regime had a 
lock on power.  However, Chapter 2 of this text will describe the origins of the leftist 
movement in Mexico and the particular goals for which the group struggled, including its 
quest for educational autonomy and demands for economic redistribution for the poorest 
sectors of society.  Chapter 2 also describes the process by which the demonstrations 
expanded from student endeavors to gain the support of other sectors of the population.  
This chapter examines as well a chronology of important events in the relationship 
between the movement and the government that led to the eventual massacre on October 
2.  It concludes with the argument that, solely based on the limited aims of the student 
movement and initial government responses to the student protests, the decision to 
suppress the movement on October 2 cannot be adequately explained.  Thus, other factors 
must be considered. 
 
11 Elena Poniatowska, “A Massacre in Mexico,” 140.  
12 Preston and Dillon, 72. 
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Chapter 3 centers on whether or not the government of Mexico could be 
considered truly democratic in 1968.  In exploring the concept of democracy, the chapter 
focuses on the structure of government in Mexico, and the integration of various groups 
into the state through a corporatist structure.  Chapter 3 will discuss the distance between 
intellectuals and the state in Mexico and how this led the government to take a more 
radical approach in the face of opposition from students and intellectuals.  Finally, the 
chapter focuses on Díaz Ordaz in particular and notes that his obsession with order 
encouraged the decision to repress those who openly opposed his policies rather than 
concede to reform.  Unlike Chapter 2, which portrays the massacre as a surprising event 
based on the demands of the student movement, Chapter 3 argues that the structure of the 
government as well as the personality of Díaz Ordaz made a harsh response to protest 
more likely. 
  Chapter 4 focuses on the role of the 1968 Olympic Games hosted in Mexico City 
in encouraging the government to suppress the movement, since the massacre occurred 
just ten days before opening ceremonies.  Chapter 4 aims to answer the question of why 
the government chose to act on October 2 by noting that Díaz Ordaz felt a need to 
eliminate dissent before the widely broadcast opening ceremonies on October 12.  In 
order to portray Mexico as a developing power ideal for foreign investment, Díaz Ordaz 
wanted to portray a disciplined youth ready to support Mexico’s ascension to power. 
Therefore, Díaz Ordaz did not tolerate any opposition that could ruin the modernized, 
civilized appearance of the Mexican people. 
  Chapter 5 discusses the international movements of 1968 that offered potential 
models for the protestors and the government of Mexico.  Specifically, it focuses on the 
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uprisings in May and June 1968 in Paris and the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia.  This 
chapter argues that both protestors and the government in Mexico were well aware of 
these prominent movements, and each group took different lessons from them.  Chapter 5 
concludes that to some degree the ultimate concessions to the movement in France made 
students more likely to emulate this movement, while the government more closely 
followed the Soviet repression of the Czechoslovak movement as their guide to action. 
The concluding chapter shifts the focus of the thesis from explaining why the 
government massacred the students to analyzing the legacy of the massacre at Tlatelolco.  
The year 1968 was a turning point that shattered the legitimacy of the ruling party, 
symbolized through the defection of poet and politician Octavio Paz.  In addition to this 
loss of credibility, the final years of the Díaz Ordaz presidency and the regimes of 
subsequent leaders continued to physically oppress opposition groups, which further 
angered the citizens of Mexico.  The chapter compares 1968 with the earthquake in 
Mexico City in 1985 as well as the strikes of 1999 as times which reflected the continual 
distrust and disapproval of the government.  Ultimately, this distaste for the PRI led to its 
downfall as the ruling party in 2000.  Finally, the thesis examines current developments 
in attempts to achieve justice for the victims through prosecution of the perpetrators of 
the massacre at Tlatelolco and later violence.  Contemporary references to 1968 and Díaz 
Ordaz in relation to the current government of PAN (National Action Party) president 
Vicente Fox illustrates that the legacy of 1968 is alive and well in Mexico, the distrust 
and skepticism of the government bred by its actions in 1968 continue to manifest 
themselves today. 
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Chapter 2: A Growing Student Movement 
On July 26, 1968, the Mexican police unit known as the granaderos assaulted a 
group of peaceful demonstrators commemorating the Cuban revolution, setting off a 
string of protests against the interventionist acts of the government.13  Paco Taibo, a 
participant in the protests against the granaderos emphasizes that rather than ordering the 
crowd to leave the streets, the police instead began attacking the group without 
warning.14  Despite the government use of force intended to deter the movement from 
spreading, many people instead felt energized and convinced of the need to continue 
protesting illegitimate acts by the police and government.  In fact, Taibo relates that 
everyone was “happy to find ourselves still in one piece” and that “fear, for now, was 
gone.” 15   
While the initial protests focused on the narrow issue of government invasion of 
school campuses, as the supporters of the movement grew in number and levels of 
organization, the scope of the movement also expanded.  The movement began to openly 
object not only to police intervention on campuses, but also to the incarceration of 
political prisoners and the hierarchical and authoritarian nature of the PRI.16  In addition, 
the presence of Article 145 of the Mexican Penal Code, which allowed the police to arrest 
any person in Mexico for committing “the ill-defined crime of social disillusion,” 
angered large portions of the populace who demanded the repeal of this provision.17  
 
13 Tariq Ali and Susan Watkins, 1968 Marching in the Streets (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 165. 
14 Paco Taibo, 26. 
15 Taibo, 28. 
16 Jeffrey Rubin, “From Che to Marcos: The Changing Left in Latin America,” Dissent, Summer, 2002, 40. 
17 Ali and Watkins, 165. 
   
   
   
  8  
                                                
Additionally, systemic issues like the prevalent economic disparities and the widening 
rich poor gap between different income levels of the Mexican population contributed to 
the student protests.  Specifically, the university students found themselves in a position 
to rebel because these “middle- and upper-strata youngsters felt ashamed that they were 
doing so well while the bulk of their fellow citizens suffered from privation and 
despair.”18  Taibo’s account of the organization of the movement focuses on the diversity 
of ideological influences of the members of the movement, and notes that all members 
worked desperately for their particular cause.19  Thus, the student movement did not have 
one coherent goal agreed upon by its members; instead the students’ beliefs generally 
centered on increasing democratization through the granting of individual liberties and 
opening up of the government along with egalitarian distribution of resources.  Taibo 
summarizes this idea and succinctly states that the demands of the movement were 
“understood and taken to heart by all” as a “call for democracy.”20  The broad rubric of 
reforms not only allowed the movement to easily recruit additional members due to its 
broad scope, but also its focus on social justice increased the moral force behind the 
movement as many people throughout Mexico felt the government should be better 
caring for the people.  
To portray the movement in Mexico as limited to a small portion of the 
population does not aptly describe the influence and resonance of these issues.  Instead, 
“the 1968 student movement was marked by support among broad sectors of the 
 
18 Mabry, 247. 
19 Taibo, 19. 
20 Taibo, 49. 
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populace.”21  The appeals for liberal reform within the existing political system appealed 
to a broad range of people.  Students, intellectuals, and members of the urban middle 
class rapidly endorsed the ideals of the movement.22  While the government continued to 
repress the students throughout the summer of 1968, other groups showed solidarity with 
the movement as demonstrated by the huge march of around 400,000 people ending up at 
the Zócalo, or the main plaza in Mexico City, on August 27.  The demonstrators in the 
protest against PRI policies included in addition to the students “their parents and 
grandparents, brothers and sisters” as well as “railway workers, oil workers, electricians, 
taxi drivers and pushcart peddlers, and small groups of peasants.”23  The descriptions of 
the event display its importance as a force for change.  “President Díaz Ordaz was 
personally vilified, in spite of the tradition against criticizing the president.  The huge 
public square, bounded on one side by the National Palace, on another by municipal 
buildings, and on a third by the National Cathedral filled with a mass of humanity…; A 
red and black flag, the international strike symbol was run up the flag pole.  Few 
government demonstrations could match it.”24  By this point, the movement had reached 
a critical mass of support and the success of the demonstration in the Zócalo illustrated 
that the push for democratization resonated with large and diverse segments of the 
population. 
In a comparative analysis of Latin American protest movements one scholar 
argues: “a revolution was happening—not Che’s revolution—but a revolution from 
within the system, nonviolent, driven by euphoria, conviction, and the excitement of 
 
21 Gutmann, 62. 
22 Markarian, 26. 
23 Ali, 165. 
24 Mabry, 259. 
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experimentation around the world.”25  While the movement’s quest for concrete changes 
provided an admirable goal, the government portrayed the protestors as dangerous 
revolutionaries.  In fact, the government warned that the protestors sought to impose a 
communist dictatorship in Mexico.  However, these paranoid statements did not reflect 
the true goals exhibited by the movement.26  In fact, a German journalist visiting Mexico 
who observed the student action argued that the protests in Mexico were not 
revolutionary, as portrayed by the government, but that the demonstrators merely wanted 
the enforcement of the existing democratic constitution.27  Unlike the guerilla movements 
that surged in Latin America during this period—which sought violent change to 
overthrow a government—the Mexican protesters had a much more moderate and 
reformist approach to political change.  Thus, the criticisms raised by the movement 
reflected neither a quest for the overthrow of the government or even ivory tower 
intellectualism, but instead sought concrete freedoms and greater equality in the 
distribution of resources. 
While the August 27 demonstration marked progress for the movement in its 
attraction of a large support base, the government refused to sit idly by in the face of the 
growing agitation.  Around midnight on August 28, members of the police and military 
entered the Zócalo and began to attack when many of the protestors refused to leave the 
area.28  President Díaz Ordaz’s informe, or State of the Union Address on September 1st 
further reinforced the hard line approach of the government, implicitly warning that the 
 
25 Rubin, 40-41. 
26 Carlos Montemayor, Rehacer la Historia: análisis de los nuevos documentos del 2 de Octubre de 1968 
en Tlatelolco (México D.F.: Planeta, 2000), 77. 
27 Mabry, 256. 
28 Mabry, 259. 
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government would use any force necessary to subdue the movement.29  With mounting 
pressure coming from both sides, the situation had become more intense.   
Throughout September, the government fulfilled its promise to take action against 
the growing movement.  For example, Taibo recalls the stepped-up efforts through covert 
police infiltration of their group which led to the arrest and jailing of many students.30  
Additionally, the granaderos invaded universities throughout Mexico City, including the 
UNAM (National Autonomous University of Mexico), which represented a major blow 
to the protesters.31  In particular, the invasion of the UNAM marked a major shift in 
government policy since the term ‘autonomous’ in the university name signified a long-
standing tradition of freedom from outside intervention within the universities.  However, 
the government violated this norm in hopes that these aggressive actions would 
effectively deter members of the movement from continuing to protest. 
While the willingness of the government to use force and the invasions of the 
schools in Mexico City did lead some members to leave the movement in fear of the 
consequences of speaking out,32 many people pushed forward in their attempts to achieve 
reform within the Mexican state.  Notably, former president Lázaro Cárdenas, who had 
been an intensely popular president amongst many groups for his support of many 
marginalized groups, voiced his support for the protest.  At a meeting with the leaders of 
the student movement, Cárdenas urged that the protesters continue in their quest for 
reform, and assured the group that Díaz Ordaz would not deploy the military against the 
 
29 Mabry, 260. 
30 Taibo, 72-73. 
31 Ali, 167. 
32 Mabry, 263. 
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group.33  While the situation had become tenser since the initial protests in July, the 
former head of state from the PRI, the same political party as the ruling administration, 
did not realize the potential for impending violence.  While in hindsight it perhaps seems 
obvious that the government was preparing for the use of force based on the variety of 
warnings, it should be noted how unlikely a large scale operation by the military would 
have seemed to citizens in Mexico in 1968.  Since the triumph of the Mexican Revolution 
in the late 1910s and early 1920s, Mexico had experienced liberal reforms during the 
terms of PRI presidents, like under the rule of Cárdenas himself.  Given the practical 
nature of the reforms and the PRI tendency to address concerns within the party structure 
through cooptation of various movements, it does not seem unreasonable that the student 
protesters believed in the possibility for change.  However, the situation of the movement 
only became more dangerous.  Taibo describes his recognition as part of the movement 
of the increasing potential for violence.  Looking back he recalls: “we expected the blow, 
but we did not know how brutal it would be.”34     
 
33 Dillon and Preston, 68-69. 
34 Taibo, 85. 
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Chapter 3: Democracy in Mexico? 
 
 The discussion of the goals and makeup of the movement provides an 
understanding of why the students chose to protest. However, solely focusing on the 
movement does not adequately explain the government rationale for the brutal repression 
on October 2.  The type and structure of government that existed in Mexico contributed 
to the decision to repress the protesters.  In particular, the post-revolutionary Mexican 
government crafted a corporatist structure, which encouraged strong state control.  
Additionally, the obsession of Díaz Ordaz with the maintenance of order illustrates that 
regardless of how reasonable the student demands seemed to participants in the protest or 
even to outside observers, the government felt threatened by the movement.  Thus, an 
investigation into the practices of the so-called democratic Mexican government provides 
insight into their decision to violently repress the students. 
 After the Mexican Revolution, the party that would eventually be called the PRI 
began to emerge as the major political entity in the country.  By 1968, the PRI had long 
since firmly established itself as the virtually uncontested ruling party and had amassed 
popular support based on economic growth and the tenures of a string of popular 
presidents.  The PRI established a corporatist structure in which the government created 
ties between various sectors of society and integrated them into the party and therefore 
the state apparatus through official networks.  In general, corporatist systems attempt to 
subvert competition for power by incorporating them into the state structure and 
weakening potential opposition by placing them at a lower level position in the hierarchy 
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than the top levels of government.35  In Mexico various groups such as workers 
organizations and agricultural groups occupied agencies and positions within the state, 
which were meant to provide stability and mutually beneficial outcomes for both the 
government and the group.  This governmental system helped to provide stability in the 
ruling regime; however, it did not encourage dissent toward the government.  In 
particular, the focus on eliminating opposition and the cooptation of outside factions 
illustrates that the Mexican government under the corporatist did not display democratic 
arrangements.  Thus the governmental structure aimed for stability at the expense of true 
representation of the citizenry.  
 Although the government did not always uphold democracy, the PRI “had been 
thoroughly popular—even though not thoroughly democratic—thanks to several decades 
of economic growth, civilian rule, and international peace.”36  While Díaz Ordaz 
portrayed Mexico as a successful ‘one-party democracy,’ this illusion only served to prop 
up the government. In fact, the institutionalized nature of the revolution made the PRI 
one party state much like the oligarchy that the leaders of the Mexican Revolution had 
initially opposed.37   Therefore, the government of Mexico was willing to do what it felt 
like it needed to do in order to stay in power without regard for the democratic ideals laid 
out in the revolutionary Constitution of 1917, as long as it enjoyed enough popularity to 
maintain the regime.  However, maintaining control became the overarching goal. 
The government, which relied on appeasing a variety of corporate groups, faced 
potential threats from external organizations that faced less severe losses for rocking the 
 
35 Reyna, José Luis, “Redefining the Authoritarian Regime” In Authoritarianism in Mexico, edited by José 
Reyna and Richard Weinert, (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977), 156. 
36 Markarian, 26. 
37 Ali, 165. 
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boat against the government.  In particular, although the economy of Mexico grew at a 
relatively rapid rate throughout the twentieth century and particularly after World War II, 
the poorest sectors of society faced economic decline as a result of unequal income 
distribution because the richest members took increasingly larger portions of the wealth.38  
Thus, the government could not adequately offer the poor a place within the state 
apparatus, making them prime agents for revolt due to their dissatisfaction.  Rather than 
representing the interests of the entirety of the population, a corrupt government allowed 
itself to be bought off by the most wealthy and more advantaged members of society in 
exchange for their political support.39  This self-perpetuating cycle allowed little space 
for the poorest members of society to advance economically.   
In addition to the bad relationship between the state and the poor, the intellectuals 
in Mexico remained relatively detached from the government.40  The separation of the 
universities from the jurisdiction of the government fit within the physical autonomy of 
the University system.  Although the schools received funding from the government 
denoting some linkages between the groups, in general the relation between the state and 
the universities remained very separated in comparison to other groups.  Therefore, since 
neither the universities nor students garnered many rewards from the Mexican 
government, and the student movement to some degree felt guilty about their middle 
class position in relation to the poverty experienced throughout the country, it is not 
surprising that the poorer sectors of society and students would unite to struggle against 
the government.  As a result, a split developed between those groups inside the PRI 
 
38 Reyna, 156. 
39 Ali, 173. 
40 Roderic A. Camp, Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Austin, TX: University of 
Texas Press, 1985), 208-209. 
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structure, and those like the poor and intellectuals who remained outside the government 
apparatus and generally protested more frequently against the PRI hold on power.41     
Despite the relative popularity and strength of the Mexican state, the government 
feared these groups due to the lack of available means that they maintained to deal with 
adversaries.  Specifically, “the corporate political structure is designed for political 
manipulation of demands, but it has no structure to absorb autonomous political 
mobilization.  The Achilles’ heel of the system may therefore be that sort of political 
protest.”42   Therefore, the structure of government in Mexico did not provide any 
mechanisms to deal with broad-based movements like the half million people who 
demonstrated during the summer of 1968 in Mexico.  Since the PRI had never faced such 
widespread opposition in the post-revolutionary period, the government in power found 
no blueprint for dealing with these opposition groups, increasing the anxiety of the 
government, and providing no guarantees for what type of action the government would 
take when faced with the opposition. 
In addition to the basic structural problems in terms of dealing with external 
groups, the personal characteristics of president Díaz Ordaz also led to an increased 
propensity for repression of social movements.  As president he stated that his primary 
concern lay in the maintenance of law and order within the society. Furthermore, in the 
personal sphere he did not enjoy many close friendships and generally maintained a 
 
41 Jorge G Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed: the Latin American Left After the Cold War, (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 1993), 156. 
42 Reyna, 164. 
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suspicious stance toward the world surrounding him.43  In fact, Diaz Ordaz’s reaction to 
the coverage of the massacre of October 2 displays his paranoid nature: 
President Díaz Ordaz followed the media coverage in minute detail.  
Televisa the television monopoly had broadcast no taped footage of the 
attack on the students, and Jacobo Zabludovsky, the network’s 
anchorman, had faithfully conveyed the government’s version of events.  
But Díaz Ordaz noticed that Zabludovsky was wearing a solid black tie.  
Zabludovsky always wore a plain black tie on the air, but Díaz Ordaz 
didn’t know that.  Imagining enemies on all sides, the President viewed 
the newscaster’s tie as a surreptitious sign that Zabludovsky disapproved 
of the killing.  Díaz Ordaz called Zabludovsky and chewed him out 
ferociously.44
 
As the person ultimately in charge of deploying the military at Tlatelolco plaza, Diaz 
Ordaz’s paranoia and obsession with order encouraged him to take any necessary action 
to suppress the movement, since students protesting in the middle of Mexico City did not 
fulfill his ideal vision of society.45  Unlike his obedient, model members of Mexican 
society, these students threatened the stability of the regime through their demonstration 
against its actions.  While the President’s personal issues should not excuse him from 
responsibility for the decision to massacre the students, his obsession with order and 
paranoia toward the world illustrates why he felt the need to act. Coupled with the dearth 
of peaceful methods available to combat opposition to the government, his personality 
ultimately makes his decision to send in the military less surprising.   
 While PRI-led governments had displayed democratic qualities like freedom of 
the press and ability to assemble, these basic democratic freedoms became much more 
sharply limited in the aftermath of the massacre.  Díaz Ordaz officially offered to 
negotiate with the protest movement shortly after it began to take shape, however, the 
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actual terms of the agreement revealed that the government left no room for compromise 
from its hard line stance.  When Díaz Ordaz offered his “outstretched hand” to members 
of the movement, the terms of the pact stated that the students must promise to acquiesce 
to the government position, and apologize for their actions.46  The pact would have then 
signaled capitulation to the government position or face severe consequences, which did 
not support democratic principles of the Constitution.  
By the time late September rolled around, the situation became even worse for 
individual liberties.  A “state of siege” developed where false arrests, detention without 
allowing access to lawyers and illegal searches and seizures became commonplace.47  
Whatever opinion one held about the nature of the “one-party democracy” in Mexico 
prior to the Díaz Ordaz government and the student protests, the situation became 
markedly worse for the democratic freedoms in the last months of 1968.  Even after the 
massacre, the President continued to use coercive tactics to yield support for the 
remaining years of his term.  Doña Fili, a woman not present at the demonstration on 
October 2, learned first hand about the strong arm of the state.  She recounts: “We didn’t 
find out about what had happened at Tlatelolco right away.  But my daughter was in a 
daycare center [run by the Mexico City government] and the director called on us to 
support the government’s position.  He hold us that if we didn’t support President Díaz 
Ordaz they would throw our child out of the daycare center.”48  Therefore, the situation in 
Mexico of 1968 remained far removed from any definition of democracy.   
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Chapter 4: The Games of the XIX Olympiad 
 An understanding of the domestic political context within Mexico helps to explain 
why the government reacted harshly in the face of student demands. However, the 
broader international context surrounding the Mexican events also helps explain why the 
Díaz Ordaz government reacted in such a severe manner to the protests.  Mexico stayed 
relatively isolated from other foreign powers during this time period, which provided 
them more freedom in their ability to deal with their domestic political problems.  This 
separation from foreign powers factored into the government’s decision to repress the 
students since “the isolation made it possible for the government to militarily crush the 
student movement with relative impunity; the strongest censure from abroad that they 
received for the massacre was a mild finger-wagging from the representatives of a few 
foreign governments.”49  Even those countries that kept up close ties with Mexico either 
turned a blind eye to the massacre or applauded Mexico’s handling of the crisis.  The 
United States government, rather than condemning Mexico for its repressive actions, 
directed the Central Intelligence Agency to share information about leftist movements 
throughout the world and supported moves to repress these groups.  Despite the US 
embassy’s full knowledge of the immensity of the massacre, the embassy maintained that 
the event was “a strictly Mexican affair.”50  Even Cuba, a country whose government just 
a decade prior to October 2, 1968 came to power through a leftist movement, refused to 
cover the shootings in their media outlets.  In fact, Mexican students in Cuba who 
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protested the killings found themselves censored by the Cuban government.51  The PRI 
felt that it could act with relative impunity against the students since even nations that 
praised themselves for their democratic governments and openness like the United States 
collaborated with the Mexican government about the massacre.  Therefore, when Díaz 
Ordaz weighed the consequences of taking military action against the protests, he could 
rest assured that most powerful countries would not speak out against his actions. 
 Despite this lack of close ties internationally, Mexico did occupy an important 
role as the host of the 1968 summer Olympic games in October.  The Mexican 
government had lobbied for the 1968 Olympic bid years prior to the event in order to 
become the first among developing and Spanish-speaking countries to host the games.52  
For the Mexican government, the success of the Olympics meant a great deal since they 
aimed to use the opportunity to showcase the country’s advancement to a modern, 
“civilized” country.  The government particularly wanted to show off the “Mexican 
Miracle,” or the high percentage of economic growth experienced year after year, to 
demonstrate their prominence as an up and coming global power.53  In order to help this 
image of Mexico as an advanced, industrialized nation the government poured money 
into the construction of new facilities for the Olympics.  For example, “thousands of 
millions of pesos have been spent on new arenas and running tracks, housing for the 
foreign teams and vast amounts of publicity—despite the fact that the Mexican 
government can never find such sums to spend on its own impoverished population.”54  
Therefore the Mexican focused its attention on the Olympic Games, as advances in 
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equitable distribution for the population would not have drawn the same type of attention 
as traditional displays of wealth.   
The Olympic Games did not just serve as a media stunt to gain acceptance 
amongst the international powers, but also offered tangible economic benefits to the 
government.  Linked to the drive for acceptance as a developed nation, the government 
and elites wanted to portray Mexico as a steadily growing economy, with a stable foreign 
investment climate.  While displaying the new infrastructure for development provided 
one method to showcase its stability, the Olympics also allowed the government to 
exhibit its ideal members of society in its regimented, diligent young athletes and other 
hardworking members of society.55  Therefore while politically the government did not 
fear a backlash based on its treatment of the student movement, the aims to achieve 
economic advancement became complicated by the presence of the protesting masses.  
To the Mexican government, the movement represented a threat to its image of a stable 
country for potential investors.  
 While the imminent presence of a variety of representatives from foreign powers 
might have caused Díaz Ordaz to act with restraint toward his own populace for fear of 
criticism from other countries, the government’s economic aims took the trump card and 
provoked the intense repression.  Additionally, the collaboration of nations such as the 
United States and other nations’ relative indifference to Mexico’s treatment of its 
domestic issues likely made the government even more apt to act decisively against the 
movement to make sure that the positive economic changes would be noticed.  The 
Mexican government did not want the images of protesting students to take precedence 
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over Mexico’s success story as a developing nation.  Thus, by October 2, 1968, the 
government had become desperate since athletes and foreign press had already begun 
arriving in Mexico and the still active demonstrations risked exposing the darker aspects 
of the nation.  For Díaz Ordaz and the Mexican government, “hosting the Olympics was 
the most important act of the year, if not of decades” therefore, “nothing could be 
allowed to interfere with this great enterprise.”56  In addition to the desire for investment 
opportunities, Mexico also wanted to be described as a country that valued social 
justice.57  The presence of protests demanding various forms of social justice would not 
create the image that the PRI wanted to project during their hosting of the rest of the 
world.  As a result, the government aimed to eliminate the internal dissent that threatened 
its ability to shine in front of its foreign visitors.  The government even went so far as to 
gather fake confessions from student leaders who supposedly indicated that the 
movement had explicitly aimed to overshadow the Olympics with its opposition.58  The 
government appeared willing to do whatever it took to prevent the student protests from 
tarnishing its desired international image in order to promote its interests.   
While the government thought that immediate suppression of the movement 
would erase the opposition from the country and provide a quick fix to the problem, the 
crackdown itself created problems with its image as a democratic, modernizing nation.  
The Mexican government, which had been particularly excited to host the Olympics in 
“El año de la paz” or “The Year of the Peace” appeared hypocritical as a host to the 
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theme of peace based on its acts toward its own youth.59  Furthermore, since the foreign 
press had already arrived in Mexico City to begin covering the games, around one 
hundred reporters from other nations came to the demonstration on October 2, preventing 
Mexico from fully utilizing its normally isolated international position.60  Despite protests 
by the Italian and Australian members of the Olympic committee, who were angry in 
particular about the injuries to their citizens, the emergency meeting over how to act in 
light of the massacre concluded that the Olympic games should continue based on the 
regular schedule.61 The President of the International Olympic Committee viewed the 
Olympics with reverence and assured that all was well since: “we have full confidence 
that the Mexican people, universally known for their sportsmanship and great hospitality, 
will join participants and spectators in celebrating the Games, a veritable oasis in a 
troubled world.”62  The head of the committee’s words illustrate the proclaimed 
importance put on the Olympics as a panacea for global troubles. The conflict over the 
protest did not register as important in comparison to the Games.  Therefore, the gamble 
that Díaz Ordaz took in suppressing the movement in order to prevent interference with 
the Olympics achieved his goals of showcasing the sanitized version of Mexico.  Without 
the presence of the Olympic Games in October 1968, the government would have been 
less likely to massacre its own citizens on October 2.  
Despite the shock among the population that the government had killed hundreds 
of its own peacefully protesting citizens, the press chose to focus on the Olympic Games 
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instead of the atrocities at Tlatelolco.63  The television crews and newspapers focused not 
on the youth brutally murdered at the hands of the Mexican government, but on Díaz 
Ordaz’s ideal ordered and patriotic youth who participated in the Olympics or helped 
portray the illusion of the modern Mexico.64  Various accounts of the 1968 Olympics 
illustrate that this falsely portrayed democratic, civilized, and economically advanced 
display captured the attention of the visitors to Mexico.  British coverage of the opening 
ceremony states: “as the doves soared away from their captivity, the Olympic flame 
burned brightly…All was well in Mexico, the city of 1968.”65  Another account 
emphasizes that attention shifted from the tragedy at Tlatelolco to the Olympics:  
Outside the stadium troops and tanks were poised beyond the view of 
television cameras.  There were no international protests, no delegations 
withdrew, and some, notably the Soviets praised the Mexican government 
for its handling of the crisis.  The Tlatelolco Massacre—the worst 
bloodshed in the country since the Mexican Revolution—was a fleeting 
news item in the international press, one more social scare of that 
turbulent year.  To this day, the 1968 Olympics are far more likely 
remembered internationally for African American athletes’ protests.66
 
Unfortunately, in the case of Mexico, 1968 was not a year of peace, but a year in which 
the obsessive focus of the Mexican government on the “oasis” of the Olympic Games 
contributed to the massacre of hundreds of its own citizens. 
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Chapter 5: International Protest Movements: Paris 68 and the Prague Spring 
 The year 1968 not only saw attempts to change the government in Mexico, but 
“nineteen sixty-eight was an attempt to create a new world, a new starting point for 
politics, for culture, for personal relations” throughout the world.67  “From Prague to 
Paris, London to Tokyo, San Francisco to Peking, student revolts erupted with unforeseen 
suddenness” which gripped the world.68  None of these movements occurred in a 
vacuum. Each subsequent movement provided a potential model for agitators throughout 
the globe. Once a violent action broke out in a particular nation, the prior examples from 
other countries offered the government lessons in how to deal with the uprisings that 
threatened the stability of the existing order.  In particular, the Mexican protest 
movement and the government looked to the situations in other countries to gain 
information to guide their actions.  As the movement in Mexico developed throughout the 
late summer, the protests of Paris in May 1968 had already peaked and declined based on 
the reforms of leader Charles de Gaulle.  In Czechoslovakia, by August 1968 the 
movement, which clamored for democratization, was suppressed by the Soviet military 
intervention, two months prior to the massacre by the Mexican military.  Therefore, to 
gain a better understanding of the Mexican student movement, the two prominent cases 
of France and Czechoslovakia will be examined to understand what kind of signals and 
lessons these examples provided to the students and government in Mexico. 
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 Although Mexico did not suffer international censure in 1968, this does not mean 
that the government or its citizens were unaware of international developments in social 
movements.  The Mexican ambassador to France, Silvio Zavala, worked tirelessly 
throughout 1968, providing reports to Díaz Ordaz about the events unfolding in Paris.69   
Díaz Ordaz’s paranoia led him to specifically focus on the real and imagined foreign 
links to the movement. The PRI government believed that the roots of the movement in 
Mexico came from foreign dissenters in some sort of conspiracy against the government.  
The government followed this theory and instructed the police to keep a list of ‘principle 
agitators’ in the protest movement, in which those with supposedly ‘foreign names’ 
garnered maximum suspicion.70  Taibo’s first-hand account of the movement confirms 
this distrust: “there had been a roundup of foreigners, most of them onlookers picked up 
on the fringes of demonstrations because they looked like hippie or student types—quite 
consistent, of course, with the hallowed Mexican political and police custom of rounding 
up a few aliens as proof of an international plot.”71  Furthermore, some members of the 
government alleged that the protestors in Mexico were financed through foreign powers 
deemed to be “hostile,” like the United States, France, and the Soviet Union.72  While it 
was possible that the movement received some degree of foreign financing, the concern 
about foreign revolutionary influence on Mexico approached hysteria.  Of the supposedly 
hostile countries, the United States government had shared intelligence efforts in regards 
to the protests and the Soviet Union leaders complimented the PRI’s quick resolution of 
the student movement.  Although the foreign groups providing tangible assistance to the 
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growing movement remained negligible in terms of financially making or breaking the 
success of the group, it demonstrates that the Mexican government was quite aware of the 
international climate of protest and followed the events closely. 
  The members of the movement in Mexico also took note of the international 
events regardless of the presence of tangible outside assistance.  At the beginning of the 
movement, the students strove “to make the same links their French comrades did, to 
widen their protest into a social revolt.”73  Thus, while fears of communist infiltration and 
foreign funding were based on Mexican government paranoia, the students did look to 
other movements to garner information about successful and unsuccessful protests.  
While the French movement offered a more successful example for the students with a 
peaceful resolution to the crisis, the Czechoslovak example provided a model for 
repression that it appears the Mexican government chose to follow more closely. 
Paris ‘68 
The uprising in Paris of 1968 held the possibility for truly revolutionary action as 
the state stood precariously close to being overthrown due to the pressure exerted by the 
movement.  By the beginning of May, student protests against inadequate institutional 
support for schools had broken out in pockets throughout Paris.74  On May 2nd and 3rd 
two universities, Nanterre and the Sorbonne, were closed down due to these intense 
political confrontations.75  At the Sorbonne, the situation became particularly chaotic 
when the University rector called the police to their request intervention to stop a political 
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meeting.76  Throughout the following week students became outraged based on the 
arrests and constant police presence, and began to unsuccessfully demand the freedom of 
the political prisoners, the reopening of the Universities, and police withdrawal from the 
Latin Quarter of the city.77  On May 10th, the students established barricades in the Latin 
Quarter to protest the continued imprisonment of their peers as well as police intervention 
in the area.  Eventually the police begun to launch tear gas and students fought back.78  
At this point in May, the conflict between the students and the state escalated into a much 
more violent phase of protest.  From this point the conflict only became more intense as 
the fervor spread across the country beyond just the students.  In particular, the student 
movement formed a strong alliance with worker groups leading to the promulgation of 
large-scale general strikes.  These strikes debilitated the nation as nearly two-thirds of the 
productive force stopped work and joined forces with the students, affecting virtually all 
sectors of the economy. 79  The government faced an extreme crisis that had grown from 
what had initially been a small student demonstration. 
By the end of May, De Gaulle realized his precarious position as the leader of a 
nation in revolt, and secretly met with the French military to confirm their armed support 
against the immense number of students and workers protesting against his regime.80  
While De Gaulle at one point considered resigning in the face of such broad-based protest 
against his government, he eventually decided to hold new legislative elections as a 
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diversionary tactic to quell the dissent and remain in power.81  To appease some members 
of the opposition, De Gaulle also submitted to other reforms demanded by the movement, 
including shorter workdays and higher wages for workers.82  Despite achieving change, 
the movement did not reach its revolutionary goals.  Given the immense numbers of 
people participating in the events of French May, the crowds did not disappear 
immediately, as many people still did not find the outcome satisfactory.  But with 
elections looming in the future for the various political parties, the government 
successfully shifted the focus toward campaigns for winning seats in the congressional 
assembly. 
  In the Parisian protests, cooperation between students and laborers worked 
exceptionally well in their ability to coordinate both interests.83  Thus, the French 
movements provided a model to other protest groups throughout the world showing the 
viability of a coordinated worker and student approach.  As discussed above, the students 
in Mexico certainly knew about the relative success of the Parisian movement, and in 
many ways modeled themselves after that movement in hopes of garnering widespread 
backing like the movement in France.  The students in Mexico allied with various 
workers groups in order to protest against the government, albeit not to the same degree 
as in Paris.  In Mexico, this alliance also worked since both sides gained from the other 
sector.  For the workers, the physical space of the autonomous university allowed a 
separate location away from intense state control.  For the students, the workers’ 
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demands for equitable economic distribution fit easily into the economic equality agenda 
of the students and provided the initial movement more broad-based support.   
Despite the links between the movements in Paris and Mexico City, the students 
in Mexico also differed from the French case in a variety of ways and did not exactly 
copy their example.  In terms of overall aims of the movement, the protestors in Mexico 
generally had more moderate demands overall and did not intend to overthrow the 
government.  Prior to the massacre at Tlatelolco, the students had agitated in order to 
ensure democratic freedoms and equality instead of government intervention, whereas the 
Parisian case demanded of resignation of the Gaullist government.84  Therefore the 
international movement did not offer an exact blueprint for the movement, but instead 
offered some degree of inspiration and solidarity for their cause. 
For the government of Mexico, the power of the French worker and student 
movement was frightening.  While De Gaulle did manage to stay in power, Díaz Ordaz 
likely wondered about his prospects for maintaining control in case similar events broke 
out in Mexico City.  While a foreign protest movement did not threaten to impose a 
communist regime as the Mexican government charged, the case of France in 1968 
offered a lesson to the PRI regime that a small student movement could spread with 
popular support throughout the entire country and potentially paralyze its economic and 
daily life.  While De Gaulle’s political maneuvering did provide some lessons to Díaz 
Ordaz, the Mexican president did not have much time to deal with the protest due to the 
imminent opening of the Olympics.  By the time October 2 came around, Díaz Ordaz 
likely thought that attempts at negotiation or small concessions would not immediately 
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disarm the movement and restore order like a swift attack.  Thus, while practically the 
demands of the movement in Mexico were less radical than those in France, the 
government reacted more harshly based on the presence of the Olympic Games, which 
demanded a quick restoration of order in the country in order to broadcast the desired 
international image. 
The Prague Spring 
 Unlike the moderate success of the protest movement in France, the Czechoslovak 
demands for democracy faced a greater degree of suppression.  Throughout early 1968 
increasing numbers of students clamored for democratization and liberalization within the 
government. 85  In early January many members of the Communist party demand that 
then current party head Antonin Novotny step down from power, and allow Alexander 
Dubcek, a reformist proponent within the party, to take over.  Dubcek successfully took 
over as party head and proposed a change to “socialism with a human face.”86  This type 
of socialism aimed to provide reforms like free elections, a truly independent parliament 
and the opening up of the economy to free enterprise.87  However, hesitant to act too 
quickly in the face of a looming, hostile Soviet presence, Dubcek waited three months 
until April to lay out the details of his plan, the Action Programme.  As a whole this 
program amounted to a reassertion of the power of the Communist Party within 
Czechoslovakia as opposed to Soviet power and influence.  The plan also made 
modifications that legalized other political parties and promised to respond more to 
 
85 Volpi, 163. 
86 Ali, 23. 
87 Ali, 56. 
   
   
   
  32  
                                                
demands from the general populace.88  While the program did not officially challenge 
Soviet control of Czechoslovakia as a satellite state, the new orientation of the doctrine 
caused many in Moscow to worry about the reforms in Prague. 
 The Soviet Union did not sit idly by in light of the proposed reforms.  Troop 
maneuvers by the Warsaw Pact members began in Czechoslovakia in early June, and 
showed no signs of ending in the near future.  The military exercises tempered the 
popular exuberance of the movement by stifling the likelihood for reform and offered a 
threat of returning to the status quo.89  A widely published manifesto signed by leading 
figures in Czechoslovakia illustrated the ominous situation within the country.  “The 
recent great apprehension springs from the possibility that foreign forces may interfere 
with our internal development.  Being faced with all these superior forces, the only thing 
we can do is to hold our own decently and not to start anything.  We can assure the 
government that we will give it our backing.”90  The situation continued to worsen 
throughout the summer.  Notably, the Warsaw Pact troops remained in Czechoslovakia, 
and the other Eastern European nations held a summit and jointly sent a letter to the 
Czechoslovak government demanding Communist Party control of the media, removal of 
freedom of the press, and elimination of “opposition” groups within and outside the 
party. Dubcek, however, rounded up a coalition of supporters on the Central Committee 
of the party signifying that he would not roll over in the face of Soviet desires. 91  By 
mid-August, Soviet leaders feared that the liberalization and democratization process 
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would become irreversible if not halted immediately.92  Therefore, on August 21, 1968, 
Soviet tanks rolled into Prague, suppressing the budding reform movement by forcefully 
eliminating its opposition.  Under the code-name Operation Danube, the Soviet Union led 
an invading force of 165,000 soldiers into Czechoslovakia.93   Ultimately the conflict 
from this invading force and subsequent occupation resulted in 100 civilian deaths and 
hundreds of casualties.  The Soviet Union had firmly suppressed the democratizing forces 
in Czechoslovakia and placed them more securely under their orbit.  Rather than 
achieving success through demands for change, the invasion and subsequent occupation 
led to hundreds of additional casualties. Thus Czechoslovakia was placed more firmly 
under Soviet control.    
 While the Mexican and Czechoslovak movements differed in a variety of ways, 
the similarities between the two movements did not escape the notice of people in 
Mexico.  Politician and writer Octavio Paz likened the Mexican movement most closely 
to the student protests in Czechoslovakia rather than France, the United States or 
Germany because in both the Soviet Union and Mexico “an authoritarian party had 
presided over decades of extraordinary economic progress.”94  However, despite these 
similarities the student demands for change in the Czechoslovak model did not offer an 
ideal movement for emulation in comparison to the French movement.  The 
Czechoslovak situation involved a conflict between a superpower and its satellite state 
while the Mexican movement focused on internal political dissent, lessening the 
applicability of the Eastern European situation.  The ultimate repression of the 
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burgeoning democratization offered a less than desirable outcome that did not fit with the 
movement’s hope for peaceful reform of the government.  Thus, the Mexican students 
likely more closely emulated the students and workers in France rather than their 
Czechoslovak counterparts.  However, the government of Mexico likely looked upon the 
unfolding events in the Eastern bloc with a greater propensity to model the Soviet 
actions. 
 Although the Díaz Ordaz government eyed the Soviet Union suspiciously due to 
its communist government, even highlighting them as a potential donor to their student 
protest, both governments found themselves in similar situations with regard to how to 
resolve growing protest and reform movements.  While the near loss of power by De 
Gaulle alarmed Díaz Ordaz and made the French government path a less appealing 
option, the firm Soviet display of power over Czechoslovakia marked the course of a 
strong regime that would not rescind its hold on power.  In both states, the current 
administrations of Leonid Brezhnev and Díaz Ordaz respectively maintained a vertical 
hold on power.  In addition, both countries had maintained the dominance of one party 
within the political sphere for decades since their respective revolutions.  Thus, despite 
all protestations of Soviet intervention into Mexican politics, the commonalities between 
both regimes made the Soviet response to protest a fruitful learning tool for the Mexican 
government. 
   In contrast to the French government, which acquiesced to some reforms in the 
face of opposition, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovak territory with tanks and troops 
did not cave in to the social movement, providing a more attractive model to Díaz Ordaz 
for maintaining his control on power.  While the demands of the student movement were 
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not particularly radical and only asked for reforms to prevent government intervention, 
the PRI did not want to lose its stranglehold on power.  Instead, the idea of quickly 
eliminating the eyesore of the movement on an otherwise prosperous and modernizing 
nation seemed appealing.  The Díaz Ordaz government’s deployment of a coordinated 
military presence to put down the movement in one fell swoop more closely followed the 
Soviet-style response to opposition more than any other movement of 1968.  While it is 
difficult to conclusively state that the Mexican government analyzed all of the 1968 
movements in great depth and then consciously chose the Soviet path as a model, the 
similarities between the two situations and government actions shows that the Soviet case 
did influence Mexico path toward repression.  At the least, the Soviet actions provided 
another situation from which to learn from another nation’s experiences.  In this case, the 
Soviet’s ability to suppress the movement without losing their stronghold on power in the 
area likely appealed to the PRI in Mexico.   
Furthermore, with the imminent presence of the Olympics in Mexico, Díaz Ordaz 
did not want to risk something like the chaos that reigned in Paris in 1968.  In the interest 
of time, the Soviet solution looked like a better approach to quell movement that had 
been flourishing throughout the summer in Mexico.  Whereas in Paris the reforms did not 
immediately stop the protest, the military presence in Czechoslovakia quickly led to a 
situation where people would not speak out against the government.  While neither 
example provided an ideal model for action, with the Olympic games only ten days away, 
the quicker suppression appeared more appealing.  Thus, absent the international pressure 
provided by the Olympic games and the examples by other movements throughout the 
world, the situation in Mexico could have been resolved completely differently.  In this 
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way the Soviet government’s compliment to the Mexican government over their handling 
of the crisis provides an important political and figurative event.  The leaders of the large 
number of governments facing protest movements recognized the commonalities facing 
each nation, and under this light the Soviet Union’s compliment to Mexico not only 
served to boost Mexican government confidence in their handling of the crisis, but also 
provided a figurative pat on their own back for their actions against the Czechoslovaks. 
The ultimate decision of the Mexican government to use military force on 
October 2 becomes much less surprising with an investigation into the specific context of 
the time period.  Regardless of the relative merit of the protesters demands, the 
corporatist structure of the PRI-led government did not provide a mechanism to 
peacefully deal with opposition from outside the state structure.  With the additional 
pressure felt by the government from hosting the Olympic Games, and the Soviet 
example of suppressing a similar movement earlier in the same year, the choice to 
intervene militarily proved the most attractive method to Díaz Ordaz at the time.  While 
the government did not face immediate repercussions through international censure or 
increasing domestic upheaval, the choice to kill the protestors at Tlatelolco carries with it 
a negative legacy that the PRI continues to bear.   
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Chapter 6: The Legacy of Mexico ‘68 
The date October 2, 1968 endures as a significant date in Mexico.  In particular, 
within the popular culture of Mexico, specific dates have become closely associated with 
ideas such that the statement of the date “1968” draws up memories of the massacre at 
Tlatelolco and the subsequent changes in Mexico.95  In fact, “the student movement of 
1968 is today one of the most powerful Mexican political myths.”96  With the date 1968, 
many people think of the rupture in the peaceful development of Mexico under the PRI to 
something more violent and repressive.  However, as with any myth, in the years since 
the massacre, different people continue to use a variety of interpretations about the year 
in Mexico.  Taibo, as a member of the student movement, remarks that for him 1968 
signifies the hundred days of growing protest against the government, however, for most 
people 1968 connotes images of the massacre on October 2.97  As years have passed since 
1968, new developments altered the meaning of what happened based on new 
information that aids interpretation of the past.  To understand the continuing legacy of 
1968 this concluding chapter will investigate both the changes that occurred in Mexico 
after 1968, and how political actors and events have altered the way that people view 
1968.   
Many scholars and everyday citizens of Mexico cite the loss of political 
legitimacy as one of the most widely documented results of the massacre at Tlatelolco.  
Through the loss of political innocence in Mexico, effectively the government became 
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subject to scrutiny to a much greater extent as people began to doubt its efficacy and 
ability to justly govern.98  While the economy continued to expand in many areas, and 
people hoped for continued prosperity for future generations, their confidence in the 
current president, the PRI, or even the Mexican Revolution as the agents to deliver 
Mexico into a better tomorrow subsided in the face of increasing skepticism and 
cynicism.99   While Díaz Ordaz successfully portrayed a sanitized image of Mexico 
internationally through the grand displays at the Olympic Games, the domestic political 
situation became much more precarious as he lost support throughout many sectors of 
society. 
The resignation of Octavio Paz, Mexico’s ambassador to India and popular poet 
over the government repression at Tlatelolco served as a blow to the legitimacy of the 
ruling regime.  Paz had worked closely with the government on the investigation of 
student movements throughout the world, and through this post advised that rather than 
use force against the students, the government should submit to their demands for 
democratization.100  While Díaz Ordaz paid lip service to Paz’s advice in affirming that 
“poets sometimes have the most accurate intuitions,” his choice to violently crack down 
on the movement shows that Paz’s input was essentially ignored.101  The decision to 
deploy the military greatly angered Paz, and as a result he resigned his post with the 
Mexican government.  While the rest of the government officials stood by Díaz Ordaz in 
promoting the official line, Paz’s resignation provided a crack in the cover story, which 
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portrayed the movement as the villains and the government as a just ruling force.102  Paz 
ridiculed the decision of the government to intervene and stated: “the massacre of the 
students was a ritual sacrifice, an act of terrorism, pure and simple, carried out by the 
state.”103  In addition to Paz’s importance as a member of the government, his fame as a 
literary figure made his dissenting voice against the official line particularly important 
within Mexico and abroad.  The example of Paz led many intellectuals within Mexico to 
reevaluate the legitimacy of the state, and summarily many of them broke from 
cooperation with the government.104  The Díaz Ordaz government quickly attempted to 
vilify Paz and sweep his statements aside.  However, opposing narratives from Paz and 
others that circulated like the following lines surely hurt the image of the government: 
(The municipal  
  employees wash the blood 
  from the Plaza of the Sacrificed.) 
  Look now, 
   stained 
  before anything worth it 
  was said: 
   lucidity.105
 
Paz’s poetry and political stance were supported by other important writers like Carlos 
Fuentes and Gabriel García Marquez who supported Paz’s decision to resign in protest.106  
Thus, while Paz did not set off a crusade of government resignations and take down the 
regime, his dissent provided a symbol for the growing resistance to PRI politics within 
Mexico and throughout the world. 
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 Despite the loss of popularity by the PRI and the Mexican government, president 
Díaz Ordaz and future leaders cracked down even further and failed to recover the 
confidence of the citizenry.  In his remaining years in power, Díaz Ordaz upgraded police 
weaponry including providing new tanks while also continuing to arrest students for 
protesting.  Furthermore, the granaderos continued to intervene in the University and 
other parts of Mexico City, while those imprisoned during 1968 continued to languish in 
prison without bail or hope of a quick trial.107  The election of Luis Echeverría as the PRI 
party successor in 1970, provided hope for political reform and reestablishment of PRI 
legitimacy, but skepticism reigned due to his position within the government as Ministry 
of the Interior during the Tlatelolco massacre.  In comparison to Díaz Ordaz, Echeverría 
made some gestures to gain back the confidence of the populace by paying attention to 
the popular sectors neglected under prior administrations.108  Specifically, he freed some 
political prisoners and increased funding for higher education.109  However, these token 
actions toward conciliation should not be overstated as Echeverría also continued the 
repressive legacy established during the prior presidency. 
 The suppression at Tlatelolco did not mark an end to the deaths at the hands of 
the government, as the massacre was “the beginning of a long government crackdown on 
its real and suspected enemies. Hundreds of people were killed over the next 15 years.”110  
Under Echeverría the most well publicized example occurred in June 1971, when 
government-sponsored forces gunned down protestors in Mexico City, killing 42 people 
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and wounding at least 100.111  Students that day in June marched in support of workers, 
freedom in the universities, and the release of political prisoners, but instead found 
forceful opposition rather than steps toward conciliation.  While the government 
distanced itself from responsibility for the deaths, police had collaborated with rightwing 
students who disliked the leftist politics and participated in the attack.112  Thus, despite 
the image of reconciliation displayed by Echeverría, the substance of his politics did not 
differ from the repression of the previous administration.   
 Despite the token attempts at reconciliation, even these seemingly positive 
reforms like increased university funding did not come without strings attached.  While 
the students protested for greater educational autonomy, the state responded by increasing 
funding to certain educational projects overseen by the state.  However, with the 
corporatist state structure instead of giving the universities more autonomy, the 
government aimed to integrate them into the state apparatus.  Therefore, “by financing 
institutions that support the activities of intellectuals, the state has created a buffer 
organization, thereby allowing the intellectual to save face while still being supported by 
the state.”113  The legacy of 1968 clearly haunted Echeverría and encouraged attempts to 
gain back the trust of the population.  However, the continued brutal repression of 
peaceful democratic movements further cemented ideas linking the PRI to the brutality of 
1968.  These attacks disillusioned members of the populace who became convinced that 
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their peaceful attempts for incremental change would never bring about the desired 
political reforms.114  
 The realization by many youth that the government would not provide desired 
democratic political reforms came to predominate in Mexico.  The movements of 1968 
did not succeed in forcing reform in the PRI led government, however, “millions of 
young Mexicans had been touched in one way or another by the protests.”115  Some 
students and intellectuals began to support guerilla movements; others teamed up with 
peasant causes, joined workers organizations, or went back to the university to continue 
their protest against government persecution.116  These varied responses indicate that no 
uniform way existed by which these energetic students displayed their political 
convictions.  However, many people remained convinced that they had to become 
involved in politics in order to fight against the period of repression established in 
1968.117  While for the government 1968 operated as a thorn in their side, for an entire 
generation, 1968 encouraged a resurgent involvement in politics and fights for justice. 
 More recent political experiences have also reaffirmed the lessons of 1968 
through the government’s continued failures at caring for the populace.  The severe 
earthquake in Mexico City on September 19, 1985, in which the government stood idly 
by as thousands of people remained trapped under rubble, further convinced people of the 
problems with the PRI government.118  Just like in 1968, the government refused to take 
any responsibility for the high number of deaths and vastly undercounted the number of 
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victims from the disaster in its reports to the press.119  As a result, “people once again 
experienced a profound loss of faith in the governmental authorities, as they were 
persuaded anew of the futility of relying on anyone in a position of power.  Perhaps the 
most salient difference between 1968 and 1985 in this respect is that in 1985 this 
perception was less shocking, representing as it did a compounded knowledge built on 
the lessons of 1968.”120  In response to the government uselessness in dealing with the 
earthquake, citizens organized informal networks to aid those in need from the disaster 
and also attempted to rescue the victims of the earthquake.121  The similarities between 
these local movements of 1985 and the student-led movement of 1968 struck many of the 
now aged members of the 1968 movements.  In fact these original demonstrators met to 
discuss the similarities between the two movements and agreed on the value of keeping 
the legacy of 1968 alive in their protests for PRI reform.122  By this point, sixty-five years 
had passed since the triumph of the Mexican Revolution that had sought social justice 
and economic prosperity for the entire population.  The failure of the Mexican 
government in the 1985 earthquake reminded an entire generation of the government’s 
failed promises for decades, and continued the decline in the legitimacy of the ruling 
party. 
 The legacy of distrust of the PRI hold on power, continued to strengthen in 1999 
when students at the UNAM went on strike and effectively shut down the University for 
many months.  Due to the similarities of location and primary role of students in the 
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protest many people compared the events at the University in 1999 to those of 1968.123  
Reflecting the cynicism and distrust in the government, one resident of Mexico City who 
had been quite young during the massacre at Tlatelolco asked members of the current 
movement: “What exactly do you want? Do you want another ’68, like when there was a 
student movement before, and a massacre?  I told them it seemed to me like that’s what 
they wanted.”124  While students continued to mobilize, emulating the prior generation of 
protestors, many people like the person cited above who questioned the protesters about 
their intentions, feared that the government would repress the movement just like in 
1968.  Thus, although over thirty years had passed since the massacre at Tlatelolco, the 
situation remained eerily similar to the past with the PRI still maintaining its hold on 
power and its refusal to grant democratic reforms.  However, the 2000 presidential 
election changed the course of Mexican politics. 
The PRI’s strategy of suppressing its opposition could not go on forever, and the 
election of opposition party candidate Vicente Fox in 2000 represented a fundamental 
shift in Mexican politics.  Journalist Kevin Sullivan notes the link between the massacre 
and the election since “many believe the Tlatelolco massacre helped hasten the end of 
decades of authoritarian rule in Mexico” 125 The youth of 1968 had grown up into a 
generation distrustful of the government, and eager to embark on a new path for Mexico.  
One of these youth, Vicente Fox, the president elected from the PAN in the 2000 election 
recalls the personal impact of the 1968 massacre.  In particular he recalled in his 1999 
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autobiography “now that time has passed, I’m convinced the government was responsible 
for that massacre, and not just when it used violence to quiet the students.  The lack of 
democracy and its dictatorial attitudes were what fed the movement.”126  Fox did not 
involve himself in politics to a great degree in 1968 as a young man working for the Coca 
Cola Corporation in Mexico.127  However, despite this distance from politics, he still 
recalled the 1968 movement as a turning point in Mexican politics that he condemned.  
Therefore, Fox’s election to the highest office in Mexico also denoted an important shift 
in the political atmosphere. 
Taibo, in his reflection of 1968 in a section of his text entitled “Thirty-Five Years 
After” remarked: “in the June 2000 elections the PRI fell for the second time.” This 
statement highlights the continually held belief that the PRI hold on power had been 
illegitimate for many years.128  Taibo’s text asserts a link between the events of 1968 and 
the ultimate downfall of the PRI in 2000 through the loss of political legitimacy.  As an 
enduring political myth in Mexico, “every political actor refers to these events in order to 
legitimize his or her voice in Mexican politics.  Past and present volley back and forth in 
the political game: narratives of the events of 1968 support present-day political 
positions, which, in turn, act upon these narratives.”129  In this way when Fox denounced 
the PRI failures during the past regimes, the legacy of 1968 which had first haunted Díaz 
Ordaz and Echeverría continued to bear down on the PRI candidates for office in the 
2000 election.  In particular Fox’s calls for accountability and denunciation of 1968 
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resonated with the population, offering him a political advantage that aided his victory in 
the 2000 election.   
 Since Fox’s election in 2000, the massacres at Tlatelolco continue to be discussed 
in terms of righting the wrongs of the past.  Prior to Fox’s election, attempts to prosecute 
the perpetrators, such as the attempt to establish a Truth Commission in 1993 to 
investigate the crimes, failed due to a lack of political will by the PRI government.130  
However, Fox has taken a more active approach toward reconciling the government with 
the massacre; first, by overseeing a government commemoration of the deaths at 
Tlatelolco on October 2, 2000.131  Also, in January 2002, Fox selected Ignacio Carrillo as 
special prosecutor to investigate the crimes and find justice for the atrocities of the 1960s, 
70s, and 80s.132  Additionally, the Fox administration aimed to prosecute 25 officials with 
the charge of genocide based on their actions relating to the massacres throughout the 
PRI rule.133  The break from the silence of the government “made accountability an 
unavoidable condition for real democracy in Mexico.”134       
However the progress toward responsibility and reconciliation with the past has 
been stilted in many ways under Fox.  For example, members of the movement who had 
always held a commemoration ceremony did not agree with the government on the 
specific details for the commemoration, and as a result the event split into two distinct 
ceremonies. Taibo reflected on the continuing fights over 1968 noting that: “as long as 
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the murderers are not brought to justice, the wounds will fester.  The special prosecutor’s 
office has moved only under external pressure, lurching this way and that, opening 
investigations and calling on ex-presidents to testify, which they refuse to do.  As for us, 
obdurate as ever, thirty-five years down the line, we are back in the street yet again.”135  
Despite the steps toward prosecution, the Mexican Supreme Court recently dealt a blow 
to attempts at achieving justice by ruling that despite the Genocide Convention’s clause 
that no statute of limitations exists for the crime of genocide, Mexico’s accession to this 
convention does not apply retroactively.136  Other nations in Latin America like 
Argentina have already begun prosecuting criminals from the Dirty War, but Mexico still 
has not successfully prosecuted those responsible for the atrocities.  Not only does this 
hurt the victims and participants in the movement, but also additionally, “Mexico faces 
the real possibility of obligatory amnesia, or forced forgetting.”137  While some people 
view Fox’s creation of an independent commission to prosecute the attacks as “a very 
critical baby step,”138 other critics of the current administration’s handling of the situation 
contend that Fox merely wants to maintain the appearance of bringing people to justice, 
but is not actually willing to take on the PRI.139   
 Recent actions by the Fox administration to prevent the PRD (Party of the 
Democratic Revolution) candidate from running for office in the 2006 presidential 
election have also created further doubt over whether the Fox regime has substantially 
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differed from the actions of the PRI.  Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the current mayor 
of Mexico and 2006 frontrunner for the presidential election, has found himself in a 
precarious position based on Fox’s political maneuvering to keep him out of office.  
Specifically, the current administration argued that he should be tried for “contempt of 
court” since the city government did not mandate the stoppage of work on a new hospital 
on a piece of land that was part of a litigation dispute.140  While the government pushed 
forward in the prosecution, which would prevent the mayor from running for president in 
the 2006 election, many people in Mexico have turned out to protest in favor of López 
Obrador.  On April 24, photographic evidence confirms that around 1.2 million people 
participated in a silent demonstration to support the Mexico City mayor, while the 
government claimed that only 120,000 actually attended the event.141  While the Fox 
administration thus continued the tradition established at the Tlatelolco massacre of 
falsifying the number of people involved in the event, the demonstrators aimed to 
continue the legacy of the 1968 movement by holding a peaceful protest to demand 
change despite its past failures.142  Unlike 1968, however, international opinion lies 
firmly against the Fox administrations actions as “even rightwing US publications 
criticised the government’s determination to prosecute López Obrador.”143  Therefore, 
the international political climate, which aided the Díaz Ordaz government’s ability to 
massacre its own population without consequences in the international sphere, has turned 
against these anti-democratic actions. 
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 In addition to the international political changes, the situation within Mexico has 
gradually changed since 1968.  Ultimately, rather than continuing its illegitimate case 
against López Obrador, the Fox regime encouraged the resignation of the attorney 
general who led the case against the mayor.144  Elena Poniatowska, who collected 
accounts from the events at Tlatelolco, stated that the government and military today are 
much less likely to suppress the peaceful protests.145  Given the more open political 
system where new parties have triumphed, certainly no single group can guarantee its 
hold on power as in the past.  Additionally, credit must be given to the protestors since 
today, “people have an idea what real democracy is, and they know they don’t have it 
quite yet.  They want governments that represent them and they will go out on the streets 
to get that.”146  Therefore, while the Fox government did not live up to the lofty 
expectations of many within Mexico, the legacy of protest ingrained from 1968 help 
achieve political opening within the country. 
The election of Fox did not provide a panacea for the problems of 1968 and the 
legacy of protest continues in Mexico.  With the 2006 election around the corner, the 
world will watch as Mexico’s populace decides whether to continue with the PAN, Fox’s 
party, return to the PRI just six years after they fell, or to pursue a different path with the 
leftist PRD.  Regardless of the outcome, the legacy of 1968 in which the populace 
distrusts the government and doubts the prospects of positive reform remains alive.  For 
Fox, the investigation into the massacre of 1968 offered him a politically popular 
opportunity to avenge the past problems of the PRI, however, he still faces criticism 
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commemoration with the interests of the current movements.   
The people of Mexico carry on the lessons of the 1968 massacre through their 
calls for democracy.  Until the government fully accedes to the necessary reforms, the 
distrust and skepticism in government action will continue.  Perhaps in the future a new 
regime will establish a truly democratic government that will finally bury the legacy of 
governmental failures.  However, until that day occurs, the year 1968 will remind many 
people of a time when the Mexican government killed its own unarmed citizens, and 
illustrates that despite progress, movements must continue to fight against the type of 
politics practiced in 1968. 
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